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Disciplinary 'Specificity' 
and the Digital Submission 
Susan Melrose 
INTRODUCTION 
My main concern in this chapter, given the relatively recent entry of expert 
performance-practitioners into the postgraduate and higher degree programme of 
the British university and more widely, is with some of the implications for the 
higher degree/postgraduate submission and its examination, when the research 
enquiry is itself pursued, in significant part, through a creative practice that 
continues, in the digital age, to involve a performance-making whose outcome 
is real-time and event-based, combining live performance and spectating - hence 
that continues to cohere with certain notions of disciplinary specificity and 
identity. 
In other words, these are creative practices that might still be called 'dance' 
or 'movement-based performance', or 'dance theatre', or 'collaborative perfor-
mance', in the postgraduatelhigher degree arena, even if it is also the case 
that each is more likely than not to bring together a number of instances of 
disciplinary mastery - lighting and sound design, dance but also choreography, 
electronic arts and music performance - upon whose contribution the researcher-
practitioner's research activity and submission' will in part depend, even if it does 
not seem to be the case that those of us who oversee and supervise such projects 
have necessarily legislated as to the status, with regard to a candidate's examin-
able submission, of another practitioner's input to it that is both itself creative 
and cannot therefore be 'owned' as such by the researcher-practitioner. 
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I want at this point to add what mayor may not be a further and not unrelated 
,/ 
complication in the case of higher degree/postgraduate submissions by expert 
performance-practitioner-researchers: where the indicative disciplinary markers 
sketched out above apply, and where either a live performance event or docu-
mentation of the same, or both (as is more generally required), are submitted for 
examination, then it seems to be almost always the case that the documentation 
submitted for examination will be digital, generally DVD-based; and, where it is 
at least 'adequate', both in terms of digital and 'dissertational' production values, 
and in terms of the 'knowledge-project' undertaken by the candidate, it is still 
likely to be the case that the performance-practitioner-candidate will have needed 
the expert input of a digital practitioner, in the production of the documentation. 
It will have needed, furthermore, control over that input that is appropriate to the 
performance register/s engaged with, in the overall research project, as a mode of 
advanced enquiry; and a degree of expertise with regard to managing the inter-
face between the performance( -making) and the digital, that allows the candidate 
to ensure that the seductive play and potential of the digital does not seem to 
'magic away' the 'resistant materialities ' (Hayles, 1999: 245) (and their own 
seductive play and affective capacity) of the live. 
PRACTITIONER-CENTRED MODES OF KNOWLEDGE, 
EXPERTISE AND THE SET-UP 
The notion that disciplinary specificity might engage modes of knowing, 'knowl-
edge objects' (Knorr Cetina, 2001: 175-188) and models of intelligibility (ways 
of seeing, knowing and doing) that differ from those that have been normalised 
within - for example - the mainstream traditions of schooling that applied to my 
own generation is one whose complexities lie beyond the reach of this chapter. 
(I mention my generation - and that of many senior university colleagues invol ved 
in higher degree supervision - specifically because I would categorise its own 
infancy, at least, as 'pre-digital', possibly lacking, on this basis, that so-called 
'cognitive mapping' (Jameson, 1991) that is now apparently shared by a younger 
generation now entering higher degree programmes.) For the purposes of 
the present enquiry, the focus of which is disciplinary specificity, practitioner-
centred knowledge modes and their implications for the formal submission 
in the digital era, I want to cite the work of Knorr Cetina on what she has 
called 'epistemic cultures' and subcultures (Knorr Cetina, 2001: 1-25), and 
to add to this perspective the notion of 'set-up' introduced by Rabinow 
(2003: 44--56). 
My argument here is simple: it is that the expertise of professional perfor-
mance practitioners whose interest is such as to direct them to the postgraduate/ 
higher degree programme of the university, is likely already to entail complex 
modes of enquiry that take place not so much through creative practice - this 
might suppose an enquiry that pre-exists, drives and conditions the enquiry that 
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follows - but as creative practice, where that creative practice is, as I have 
suggested above, complex, often multi-participant, relationally complex and 
internally differentiated. There are two different set-ups within which the expert-
practitioner-researcher operates: the wider arts community/ies within which 
her or his expertise has been externally acknowledged as such, and the higher 
degree context. The set-up, according to Rabinow, is a network of heterogeneous 
and loosely linked institutional arrangements, pre-suppositions, expectations, 
attitudes, laws, ways of seeing and doing, concern with provenance and evidence, 
evaluative and interpretative models and understandings and so on. Each of these 
elements plays its part in disciplinary practice, and in the research context and 
culture; only some of them are consistently articulated discursively, but all of 
them participate in judgements of taste and value. In the case that concerns me 
here, where higher degree research is overlaid upon the economy of performance 
production, we might well expect to find certain elements of these two set-ups 
that 'fit', and some that do not; some might even be in sharp contradiction 
with each other. 
Knorr Cetina is a sociologist with a particular interest in what she calls. 'knowl-
edge practices ' (2000: 175-188) and how these operate within cultural contexts. 
Her reference to 'epistemic' or 'knowledge cultures' and subcultures seems to me 
to be particularly useful to my concern with expertise (in the performing arts 
and in the higher degree context): epistemic practices are- 'knowledge-centred 
practices' - I would identify choreography as one such; while 'epistemic objects' 
are those that 'bind[ ... J experts to knowledge things in creative and constructive 
practice[s]' (1999: 182). These knowledge 'objects', she clarifies, are 'processes 
and projections rather than definitive things'. They are 'in the process of being 
materially defined' by the very research practices that identify them as being of 
research interest in the first place. To give you a sense of what I think Knorr 
Cetina means here, I want to identify 'integrity (in performance)' , 'affective 
potential', the 'expert-intuitive processes in creative decision-making' and 
the 'logics of production specific to the discipline/s' as four such apparently 
nebulous, but vital 'epistemic objects' which an expert performance practitioner-
researcher might identify to be of particular interest to explore in the higher 
degree research set-up, precisely because they have proved to be of interest in 
expert or professional performance-making presented to and validated in terms 
of the wider arts communities. Each of these four, it seems to me, unwritten/ 
unspeakable in terms of some decades of published enquiry in the field, presents 
a particular challenge to researcher-practitioners, not least in those set-ups, like 
that of higher degree research, where research practices (knowledge practices) 
need to be documented precisely because the research activities and their 
'objects' are action and process oriented, 'rather than definitive things' -
although some may mistakenly assume that the available 'definitive things' of 
performance (e.g. 'the performer' or 'the body' or ' the show', that seem to lend 
themselves more readily to certain attempts at 'capture'), are indeed what perfor-
mance and performance research are made of. 
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What Knorr Cetina understands by a 'knowledge-thing' is revealed in her 
account of 'epistemic cultures', which recalls Rabinow on set-ups. Epistemic 
cultures are once again more apparently nebulous than definitive; they are: 
... amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms - bonded through affinity, necessity and 
historical coincidence - which, in a given field, make up how we know what we know. 
(1999: 1) 
'Epistemic cultures' or subcultures, she adds, 'create and warrant knowledge', 
and the analysis she proposes is one that explores 'the meaning of the empirical, 
the enactments of object relations, [and] the construction and fashioning of social 
arrangements' within a disciplinary field (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 1). 
I have described discipline-specific creative practices, above, as complex and 
internally differentiated. The qualifiers are important to what follows for a 
number of reasons: first, the noun 'practice' has become a major discursive player 
in certain fields and areas of research over the past decade; yet its ubiquity 
and apparent usefulness in these fields - it allows some of us, for example, to 
challenge the classic philosophical divide between something conventionally 
primary called 'theoiY' and something secondary called 'practice' - means that 
some of its users seem to me to run the risk of overlooking the fact that anything 
identified as 'a practice' is likely to entail a set of different and indeed uneven 
processes, performed within a particular set-up, to particular ends, where that 
set-up momentarily lends to those processes their particular identity. Rehearsal 
practices in the performing arts, for example, may function to elicit work from a 
performer or performers that will constitute new performance material, but they 
may also involve processes of repetition, aiming at detailed development and 
mastery of predetermined performance material. In both cases, the work of direc-
tor or choreographer is delicate, painstaking and developmental, and likely to be 
characterised by highly individualised and often idiosyncratic processes, but 
these tend to differ remarkably when the projected outcome is identified as 
'devised' or 'text-based', 'work in progress' or 'research led'. What characterises 
all of the rehearsal or workshop processes, however, is their radical difference 
from the performance outcome, where that outcome is presented to an audience, 
real-time event-based and involving the active presence of live spectators. 
The 'knowledge objects' specific to the making, the ongoing enquiry that they 
enact, their developmental status at any moment-hence their incompleteness 
at any time-are constitutively un-likely to be crystallised in the performance out-
come as such; un-available as such to spectating, what tends to be made 
available in the performance event is their transformation into the performance 
effects of the making. In terms of the higher degree/postgraduate research enquiry 
itself, carried out as creative process, the performance event, despite its capacity 
to refocus attention on spectating and thereby on 'the enactments of object 
relations, [and] the construction and fashioning of social arrangements' within 
the expert or professional performance subculture (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 1-25), is 
rarely itself the research-specific 'knowledge object', even if it is indeed the case 
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that it can stand as one momentary instantiation of the project, which allows that 
refocus on the spectatorial social and inter-relational. In research terms, 'we' - by 
which I mean the postgraduateihigher degree performance economy - want to 
know something other than what we see in the performance event (where, 
in some senses, what we actually see is our own relationship in and with 
' the work'). 
Not only, then, does spectating, in the public event, involve practices and 
processes which are incommensurable with those specifi<; to the making as an 
advanced enquiry; not only do the models of intelligibility that inform spectating -
present but distanced, omni-attentive, often objectifying ('the performer' ); visu-
ally focused and meaning-productive - differ radically from those engaged in 
performance invention; but, more importantly for the present enquiry, those 
'knowledge objects' identified by Knorr Cetina, the 'processes and projections 
rather than definitive things ' specific to the making, are unavailable as such 
to spectating. The outcome made available (in the present example, to spectat-
ing) is, in terms of the research enquiry, a momentary instantiation of a research 
undertaking that is non-identical with the research undertaking itself (2001: 
181-183). 
As non-ideqtical - effectively - with itself, a momentary and incomplete 
instantiation of the enquiry itself, and unavailable as such to spectating - upon 
which the very status of expert performance-making does however depend -
these aspects of performance-making are equally unavailable to those who might 
lend their digital expertise to the postgraduate/higher degree candidate seeking 
to document her or his work. The 're~l work' was the developmental creative 
process, yet it is likely to be the case that what that creative decision-making 
constitutively entails is invisible to the documenting eye. I have written else-
where at length on the difficult history, as 'knowledge object', of what I have 
called the 'expert-intuitive processing' that I see as central to the practices of 
expertise in the creative and performing arts 1. For historically specific reasons, 
something hypostasised as 'intuition' - a noun, rather than a process word - has 
been largely marginalised, indeed erased from, much of the published writing of 
Critical Theory, Cultural and Performance Studies - as largely have, by the way, 
enquiries into the expert and the professional in the creative arts. My argument in 
this chapter concerned with the postgraduate/higher degree enquiry turns on the 
need to recuperate expert-intuitive processes as key to expertise in the creative 
arts. Expert-intuitive processes are both constitutive to creative decision-making, 
and their output systematically undergo~s, in the hands of the expert/professional 
practitioner and in the developmental processes of the making, a degree of trans-
formation when that output come into contact with the production logics specific 
to the discipline. 
What are the implications for that documentation that is indispensable to 
the research submission, where documentation alone can guarantee to live 
performance in the higher degree context its capacity to be disseminated to the 
wider research community? Put simply, as expert spectator and performance 
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document-maker, I can neither see nor hear expert-intuitive processing at work, 
precisely at that moment when I know it is working - and nor, then, can the 
camera or sound recorder; and if I can, in many instances of working with expert 
practitioners, see or hear its outcome or effect in the making processes, I cannot 
see either the cause of that effect, nor what happens in performance-making 
developmental terms, when the outcome of intuitive processing meets the 
production processes equally vital to expert performance-making in one or 
another discipline. Along the same lines, the higher degree candidate/expert-
practitioner-researcher cannot begin to see the processes constitutive to her own 
creative practices unless and until we allow her to acknowledge their vital role, 
as 'knowledge objects' in enquiry into the set-up specific to the making; she 
cannot begin to see what Knorr Cetina calls the 'amalgams of arrangements and 
mechanisms - bonded through affinity, necessity and historical coincidence -
which, in a given field' (1999: 1), make up how she knows what she knows as an 
expert practitioner. 
How then might the higher degree candidate identify, document and archive 
disciplinary specificity, in performance-making practices, as distinct from 
the practices of expert spectating, upon which much performance-documentation 
tends to be modelled? What is at stake in this question is the issue of the 
university'S failure, over recent decades, to engage theoretically with 
disciplinary specificity, in contrast with the widely preferred and marketable 
'interdisciplinarity.' 
CAN WE RE-MEMBER THE UNSEEN, THE MARGINALISED, 
THE UNSPOKEN AND THE ERASED DIGITALL n 
I have made a number of points, above, with regard to knowledge made widely 
available through published writing in the university, contrasting that knowledge 
with expert performance-making set-ups, 'knowledge things' and models 
of intelligibility that are both constitutive to disciplinary practices in the arts 
professions and largely erased from, unspeakable within or invisible to that 
published writing which attempts however to concern itself with decision-
making in the creative and performing arts. I have drawn o~ the insight of Knorr 
Cetina (2001: 181), to suggest tha~ in some of these cases, key 'knowledge things ' 
specific to the making are 'processes and projections rather than definitive 
things', which quality tends to lend itself to their overlooking. I have suggested, 
equally, that the input of digital technology to the research degree documentation 
project might, with the very best of intentions, overlook or magic away precisely 
what needs to figure in documentation if we are to attempt to do justice to 
creative decision-making as a significant part of the postgraduatelhigher degree 
enquiry. 
I have intimated, indeed, drawing on the notion that different generations 
involved in the same higher degree programmes might be differently 'cognitively 
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mapped' when it comes to 'knowledge things' and processes in the digital age; 
and I have argued that some of us, expert though we may be, do not necessarily 
know what we need to know, or say, or show, if we are to begin to account for the 
specificity of disciplinary practices in the field . I want at this point to clarify 
my sense (I use the term advisedly, lacking an adequate evidential basis) 
that where certain knowledges in expert practice have been widely erased or 
marginalised - in part because the established and scriptually based research 
degree programme prioritises older knowledge objects - expert performance-
maker-researchers may well not know what they have forgotten in the 
making processes. It follows that the not-known or forgotten is unlikely to be 
documented as such, however well-meaning the team that attempts to document 
the process. 
It is on these sorts of bases that I propose to identify certain categories 
of knowledge-object (or objectual practices) that are widely omitted from post-
graduate programmes in the university, despite the sense (once again) of their 
pertinence that most expert practitioners retain; these are 'knowledge objects' 
that the expert practitioner and those who evaluate her work hold onto, but that, 
in my experience at least, relatively rarely constitute a major research focus 
in postgraduate work and that research documentation, as a consequence, rarely 
remembers. The first is expert-intuitive processing in creative decision-making 
that is expert in kind; the second is signature practices which - for knowledge-
historical reasons - many in Cultural Studies continue to overlook in their 
preference for knowledge systems in place of the name of the artist, even though 
it is through her or his ability to identify and engage with these that the named 
expert practitioner's work is known. Signature, it is worth noting here, is 
practised, tends to be im-pressed, rather than to have its own 'thingness'. 
The third, rehearsed to some extent in the Deleuzian tradition (Deleuze, 
2001: 26) and taken up more recently by Brian Massumi (Massumi, 2002), is 
singularity (or the aspiration to the same in the named arts practitioner's work); 
the fourth is the sensibility of the expert practitioner. A fifth objectual practice, 
bound up in the previous three, has been identified in Massumi's work (2002) 
with regard to the artist as a working practitioner, as qualitative transformation 
(162) - the need, in the artist, as futurologist, to focus on the next piece of work 
(which might 'be better' able to articulate the artist's own ongoing quest and 
enquiry), rather than earlier work or the previous work, which tends to be the 
piece with which the academic researcher, whose work is necessarily backward-
looking, wants to concern herself. 
If these are both articulated in and indeed constitutive to the making processes 
and outcome of the researcher-practitioner's work, yet their name is rarely spoken 
as such when it comes to the usual reading in the higher degree programme in the 
university, how might any of us proceed to re-member them, when it comes to the 
effective documentation of 'own creative practices' in the higher degree set-up? 
I have indicated that I sense that these objectual practices are constitutive; I would 
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argue, in addition, that 'we' know them when we see them, in the university, 
rather better than we know how to instruct others to identify them. 
On the basis of these sorts of observations, my question continues to be 
who should and can document and archive expert performance-making prac-
tices, in a practice-led-research context? I have argued elsewhere (Melrose, 2007) 
that it is solely on the basis of the higher degree programme's recognition of the 
disciplinary expertise of the practising artist, and on our ability to discursively 
articulate - on her and our own behalf - what is specific to her expert practices, 
that we can begin to identify what is needed of the IT-practitioner who would 
effectively document another's postgraduate or doctoral research. We do need to 
acknowledge that, like the expert arts practitioner and the expert performance 
researcher, the digital practitioner is similarly expert. But what this shared exper-
tise means in terms of practice, given my argument above, is that all three of 
us, as experts in our disciplines, tend to make decisions via the operations of a 
discipline-specific expert intuition. 
I proceed to argue in this chapter that it is time for some of us in the higher 
degree programme to' identify expert-intuitive processing, signature practices 
and the aspiration to singularity in expert decision-making as such, if we are to 
begin to master some of the implications of these knowledge things, not least for 
documentation or archiving of an other's expert-practices in the higher degree 
set-up. As long as some of us fail to do so, we run the risk of replicating, in the 
higher degree documentation produced, precisely that erasure of data specific 
to disciplinary specificity, disciplinary expertise and performance-making 
processes - rather than spectatorial practices and their secondary processing -
that seems to me to characterise much current research degree work presented for 
examination. 'We' - in generational terms - run the risk, in the higher degree 
programme, of drawing on that (,pre-digital') writing whose importance figured 
in our own higher degree studies, despite the clearly demonstrated fact that such 
writing, almost by definition, is expert but spectatorially positioned, with regard 
to what it has taken to be its analytical object. Isit provocative to observe here 
that the writing of Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, is both expert, and in general spectatorially 
positioned with regard to its target object? As an expert practice of writing, it is 
embedded within and operates within expert writing, even if some of it attempts 
systematically to target practice modes that lie outside writing. When we come 
back to Knorr Cetina's notion of the 'amalgams of arrangements and mecha-
nisms - bonded through affinity, necessity and historical coincidence - which, in 
a given field, make up how we know what we know', we might need to acknowl-
edge that the amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms, the knowledge objects 
and the models of intelligibility that make up how the critical theorist knows 
what she knows, tend to be scriptural (de Certeau, 1984), writerly, to operate 
within and in terms of a writing mastery of whose registers often lie outside the 
established expertise of the arts practitioner. 
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WHERE/HOW TO BEGIN? 
Memory, remembering and forgetting - if not in their specific relationship with 
arts practitioner expertise - do figure in and in some instances are explicitly the-
mati sed in the work of a number of twentieth century writer-philosophers, as are 
certain questions relating to the nature andperformative power of art itself. The 
writing of Jean-Francois Lyotard, concerned notoriously with the postmodern 
and with master narratives (Lyotard, 197111984), has also observed more recently, 
of the artwork, that the signature artwork tends to disarm the viewer; it tends to 
disarm 'thinking machines' or 'representing machines' (Lyotard, 1991: 17) -
hence, those engaged by the critical writer. If Lyotard's judgement of the 1980s 
was valid, it might seem that something 'in' that art tended to locate itself, on or 
outside the margins of written and possibly digital inscription. In the face of art's 
- . powers to disarm, however, the response of the academic and critic is to seek at 
great haste to write 'twenty or one hundred pages', in an attempt 'to pick up the 
[mind's] pieces, and [to put] the plot together again'. That expert writerly picking 
up of the mind's pieces, by the academic and critic, immediately renders that 
experience historical, and the critical commentary both reactive, spectatorially 
centred, and other to that art with which it nonetheless purports to engage. 
Attention has shifted hence from cause to effect, from artwork to art effect; with 
the consequence that enquiry has shifted to the spectator, and away from any 
sense of either the artwork or the signature and sensibility of the artist as inventor 
and futurologist. This is a curious but widespread peculiarity of what might be 
called 'art-writing'. Art-writing, in tum, 'stages' and reproduces the dominant 
models of intelligibility that informed critical perspectives from the 1970s 
onwards and that are widely taught in postgraduate seminars; it replicates a schism 
between the communication sciences, on the one hand, and aesthesis, or the oper-
ations of aesthetic judgement, on the other hand2• What I have called 'signature 
practices' in the making, and the singularity and qualitative transformation the 
artist aspires to, have as a consequence of this sort of schism, been systematically 
under-theorised in the set-ups that have dominated in the older university, not 
least under the headings of critical theory and the critique of representation. 
On this basis, 'the show' is not 'the [research] thing', and nor does 'the show' 
constitute, in itself, whatever I am recognising as signature: the signature of the 
artist is likely, instead, to emerge with time, on the basis of performance regu-
larities identifiable across the researcher's body of work. In performance-making 
terms, choreographic regularities tend to be identified through engagement 
with a complex, historically differentiated practice-memory, which informs and 
conditions expert-intuitive process and decision-making, where these are 
equally conditioned by the aspiration to the new, to qualitative transformation 
(Massumi, 2002), and, in Knorr Cetina's terms (2001: 185), these are 'under-
girded' affectively. 
Can we require of the digital document-maker that he or she be concerned 
with the enquiry into signature practice, into the indices of affective investment 
DISCIPLINARY 'SPECIFICITY' AND THE DIGITAL SUBMISSION 307 
and where and how these might be identified, and into the practitioner's own 
drive to qualitative transformation? Such a concern would mean that the docu-
mentation processes need to enquire into their own capacity for presentation and 
representation. We might need, if that were to be the case, to call for a reflective 
digital practice and practitioner, a capacity for praxiological enquiry (an enquiry 
through expert practices into expert practices) in the digital document-maker, 
which I would argue is likely to lie within her or his competence - yet this might 
suggest that the digital document-maker needs herself to be a researcher. Any 
such praxiological enquiry needs to be attentive to the different registers 
and peculiarities of practice, as these are deployed in different discipline-specific 
set-ups. The encoding ~cheme or schemes adopted, and the meta-data that apply, 
need to take onboard, and to categorise, not only knowledge complexity, but 
the ongoing speculative nature we might expect of the practice-led enquiry in the 
higher degree set-up. 
Lyotard's The Inhuman (1991) is subtitled with deliberate informality, in 
the French, Causeries sur Ie temps, or 'chatting about time', and these chats 
include the subject of the times of art-making. In Lyotard's terms, the artist's 
signature practices might equally be resistant to digital inscription - at least if the 
latter is pursued unreflexivel y. His 1980s use of the term 'digital inscription' is 
unlikely to have come out of much hands-on experience of digital inscription; he 
was, after all, a professional philosopher-researcher and writer. It is rather more 
likely to have come from others' written observations on the digital, including 
Adorno's observations on music, which Lyotard cites. As far as the twenty-first 
century digital is concerned, then, Lyotard's 'conversations' of the 1980s are 
'history'. His expertise as philosopher, meanwhile, was writing-based, and it 
took writing as its means of production as well as its outcome. His interest in 
aesthetics in the 1980s, then, 'comes out of' the registers of writing specific to 
the discipline of philosophy, and out of the perspective of expert spectator -
whence my caution. As philosopher, Lyotard tried nonetheless to focus on what, 
according to his own disciplinary orientation at the time, might seem to resist 
writerly inscription. 
The art-effect (we need to (ecognise the implications of the final term) 
dis-arms, for Lyotard, in the way it brings uniquely together an abiding enigma 
and the work's technicity; the greater its technicity, he argues, citing Adorno 
(Lyotard, 1991: 'Matter and Time'), the greater the likelihood that it will make 
itself available to digital inscription; but as a direct consequence, the less its abid-
ing enigma is available to be grasped as such. There are a number of points I want 
to make here: first, Lyotard's clear concern is with the impact of the work on a 
perceiver, and not with the work of making the work. Second, while Lyotard's 
highly conventional attempt to dissolve the art into two qualities - the technical 
and the enigmatic - has a certain appeal, my own approach has been to argue that 
creative decision-making proceeds through the catalytic interrelationship of - for 
example - (the outcome of) expert-intuitive processing and the production logics 
specific to the discipline. My identification of expert-intuitive process in creative 
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decision-making as a model of intelligibility vital to the making sets out quite 
particularly to recuperate that expert-intuitive processing from the realm of the 
other-than-rational, where so many have sought to locate it, to the detriment of 
performance theoretical writers ' understanding of creative process. Exp~rt­
intuitive outcomes, in other words, partake of both the enigmatic and of the 
technical, are constantly tested in terms of the technologies (in the widest sense) 
of performance-making and its events. 
My third point returns to issues already raised above: the 'picking up of 
the mind's pieces ', by the academic and critic immediately renders the initial, 
spectatorial engagement historical: the 'is it happening?', of Lyotard's sublime 
(1994) is thereby rendered - and recuperated - as 'it happened' . The academic 
and critic, on this basis, are history. Yet Lyotard hardly seems to be unaware of 
some of these difficulties: one remedy to be found in his essay on time, which 
might seem to allow us to document while abstaining from these instances of 
secondary appropriation in the case of the expert practitioner's work, would be to 
undertake a process of documentation that might 'mediate [ .. . ] what happens 
before reacting' to it (1991: 58-77). The timing of documentation, on behalf of 
the expert arts practitioner-researcher, is thus critical. By my use of the words 'on 
behalf of ... ', I mean a documentation carried out in terms that relate as tightly 
as possible to the practitioner's creative practice pursued as an advanced research 
enquiry. I would argue that it needs to begin to be undertaken before it seems to 
be necessary or useful, and visited systematically throughout the schedule for the 
development of the research project. 
The research undertaking and its documentation needs to begin to engage 
with the making processes, well in advance of the performance event (which is 
not necessarily its primary focus), in a set-up activated on the basis of an evalua-
tion of the practitioner's already-evidenced expertise. One should, thereafter, be 
able, with expert process in mind, to begin to engage with and document the time 
of the work's evolution, leading up to something like 'the work that finishes 
the work' - as Lyotard has so neatly put it, albeit in reference to Freudian psycho-
analysis (1991: 56). Without that engagement with the making processes, in the 
research context, the academic researcher's attempt to seem to put the work back 
together again, after experiencing it, is likely to be other to the signature effect 
that I am targeting, and would thus 'owe[ ... ] nothing', in Lyotard's words, 'to the 
place [the work] can take (and which in a sense it never takes) in the intrication 
of sensory positions and intelligible meanings' (56-57) specific to the practitio-
ner's understanding and undertaking. 
EXPERTISE, DISCIPLINARY SPECIFICITY AND 
ITS DOCUMENTATIONS 
We might expect that the praCtItIOner herself, bringing her expert recall of 
what she was looking at and staging, in the developing work, and how she then 
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realised it in terms of professional production logics and production values, is 
best placed to provide valuable input to the effective documentation of what we 
widely accept to be 'her work' in the higher degree set-up. Her insight, in the 
terms I have set out, should lie in her ownership of and ability to recall the initial 
impetus and the making processes themselves, as distinct from their outcome. 
Yet a number of factors come into play here, particularly when the candidate is 
constrained to seek to find some kind of empirical fit between the higher degree 
set-up and its own knowledge project and those specific to creative practice. 
I have argued that certain models of intelligibility and 'knowledge-objects' 
are highly particular to her disciplinary mastery and expertise, and added that 
these tend to be non-identical with the models of intelligibility and 'knowledge-
objects ' to be found in the higher degree seminar that widely continues to be 
preoccupied with the production of writing in complex registers, pursued from 
particular positions with regard to its analytical object. Lyotard's identification of 
the abiding enigma of the artwork, regardless of the fact that his concern is with 
the art-effect, may well apply to the artist's own grasp of her 'process', not least 
in the sense that a creative ' unknowing ' is often cited by the arts-practitioner as a 
way of seeing and knowing that is vitally important to making new work. 
Lyotard's concern with what he called 'digital inscription' , in the mid-1980s, and 
apparent failures of that inscription when it comes to art's abiding enigma, 
promotes me to ask, at this point, whether we can now anticipate a better 'fit' 
between the operating systems available to the digital documentation of creative 
process more generally, and their effects, when our concern is with the digital 
documentation of discipline-specific creative process. 
Massumi's qualitative transformation and the futurology he attributes to the 
practising artist (Massumi, 2002: 4) together seem to suggest a willingness in 
many artists to shake themselves free of certain sorts of knowledge acquired at 
particular points in the making. What I have sometimes seen as a wilfully retained 
'expert unknowing' in expert practitioners' process is plainly likely to manifest 
itself with regard to the expert-intuitive operations themselves, to the impact of 
contingency and happy accident on production processes, and to the notion of 
what the emerging work might or might not seem to thematise. Yet at the same 
time, in expert practice, mastery of modes of production, taken in the fullest 
sense, grows in the doing of it, as a set of practices few of which are developed 
discursively in the same practitioner. In his 'Derridean dispersion and Heideggerian 
articulation' , practice theorist Charles Spinosa (in Schatzki et aI., 2001: 199-212) 
accounts for this sort of practice mastery in terms of its acquisition through what 
he calls a ' tendency of [practice] elaboration' (200) that both contributes to 
expertise and is likely not to require either full awareness of that process, or any 
discursive articulation of it. 
Similarly, that the artwork lends itself notoriously to endless unfoldings sug-
gests a complexity of signifying potential that the professional arts practitioner 
(Francis Bacon's painting in Deleuze's account [2005] comes to mind) might well 
sense, without aspiring to participate in those processes of meaning-production . . 
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Sensing is taken by that practitioner not merely to be a wholly adequate mode of 
knowing but one that is preferred to discursive articulations - a fact that we might 
need to explore from the perspective of the range of models of intelligibility that 
apply, rather than disparage. That sense and sensing, here, are bound-up with 
an exercise of judgement, in the expert arts practitioner, that parts at least of 
the wider arts community/ies have validated is, once again, a matter whose 
complexity lies beyond the reach of this chapter. 
I have rehearsed some of the knowledge 'difficulties' of expert creative pro-
cess and its anticipated digital documentation in the field of the higher degree 
submission, in order to raise the question of how we might test these knowledge 
specificities against the epistemic specificity, the 'amalgams of arrangements 
and mechanisms - bonded through affinity, necessity and historical coincidence 
- which, in a given field, make up how we know what we know' in the field of 
digital practice. In order to begin that task, I want to cite Rudi Laerman and 
Pascal Gielen's 2007 web-published, 'The Archive of the Digital An-Archive', as 
an example of writing in the field that comes out of what I persist in identifying 
as the disciplinary set-up specific to the sociology of the arts. 
The writers announce an explicit Foucauldian interest in 'the law of what can 
be said ' , as their starting-point. In terms of the notion of a disciplinary set-up that 
I have begun to identify, their published article itself suggests to me that the 
authors write, if I might put it this way, out of writing itself, and out of what 
I would identify as a critical ' belief in' writing as the dominant knowledge-
medium. Despite a stated concern with 'contemporary cyber-reality', their 
disciplinary set-up seems - again on this limited evidence - not merely to privi-
lege writing, but their text is repeatedly concerned with what they identify as the 
'ongoing discourse "on" the digital archive' (my emphases). The archive users 
they reference, in turn, typically' read data ' (my emphasis), rather than viewing 
it, thereby prioritising the orders of writing and reading; and the writers them-
selves openly observe that even in the case of ' the treatment of images and sounds 
(both need words in order to become meaningful) [in archival terms]' . 
Meanwhile, Laermans and Gielen (2007) set out observations on the differ-
ences between a database, which is user-need oriented and hence open to con-
stant update, and an archive, which is a necessarily closed and hence stabilised 
database. They note the fairly widespread argument that 'the digital' and ' the 
archive' 'are clashing notions because they refer to the basic, and opposite, 
characteristics of old and new media', and, as a consequence, that the digital 
archive is differently evaluated by traditional archivists and 'new media' archive 
specialists. Where their work seems to me to become more compelling, is in their 
identification of what they call the 'hidden performativity of computer programs, 
which make information production simultaneously possible and impossible' . 
'The archive of the [digital] archive' itself, note the writers, is ' not neutral' . 
They cite Wolfgang Ernst's observation (2002) that 'Behind every collection 
[of information] that is dressed up in a narrative or iconic way stands a bare 
technological structure, an archival skeleton that is with strategic consciousness 
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withdrawn from discursive access on the level of the interface ( ... )'. 'Apparently 
without irreversible hierarchies', they note, still citing Ernst, 'the system of tech-
nical transfer and storage protocols is, beyond the visible surfaces, much more 
rigid than a traditional archive ever was'. In media-theoretical terms, the writers 
add, 'most users do not actually observe the [ ... J mediating and performative 
role of the different sorts of programs on which they rely when storing, retrieving 
or processing information'. What is at work, the writers point out, at this unob-
served and generally speaking unobservable level, is a 'sub-media space within 
which hierarchies of carriers of signs lead into dark opaque depths'. 
From the point of view of the known and knowable in expert performance-
making practice that I have set out in this chapter, the writers' uses of qualifiers 
like 'dark' , 'opaque' and 'unobserved' are momentarily appealing: there is an 
order of the unknowable here; yet it is an order identified by the writers as operat-
ing performatively in a 'sub-media space' of 'dark opaque depths' , from where it 
exercises a control that might seem to peiform the performers, removing from 
them a capacity for choice that they might otherwise take to be their own. If we 
were to review this sketch for a model of knowledge against the disciplinary 
specificity of performance-making practices, we might be obliged to acknowl-
edge that what I have identified throughout in terms of the specificity of the 
discipline pre-exists and provides the constitutive ground to the practices of 
expert performance-making engaged in the higher degree set-up by the candidate 
concerned. We do not need to dramatise these in terms of 'dark opaque depths'; 
indeed I should prefer to draw on the Deleuzian model of a 'plane of immanence' 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 49), whose reach and power are such that all 
instances of new practice are always already given. 'Dance', in other words, 
predetermines, regulates and controls certain constitutive aspects of inventive 
practice even in the hands of the edgy, challenging practitioner, and it informs the 
expectations and modes of engagement of performance's spectators; yet it is 
almost certainly the case that this order of control is extra-discursive. It is 'held', 
and it is progressively elaborated, for one or another expert practitioner, in the 
practice of it. 
When Laermans and Gielen note an order of control operating in the digital 
realm that is relatively inaccessible to and unownable by the user, my own sense 
is that the expert user, in the higher degree set-up, will have insight into these 
complexities. After all, the determining player operating in the writers' 'dark 
sub-medial space', in mediological terms, surely emerges on the basis of industry 
standards, regulated by Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS). 
These industry standards, as I understand it, are agreed not only between 
multiple authors but between authors and vendors of these systems, in order to 
maximise ' inter-operability ' between systems. 
Unlike the plane of immanence in dance, however, all operate in the digital 
arena within a linguistic frame and use 'pseudo-code' (programming statements) 
which resemble language, and programming algorithms which are normally 
stated in standard language before being translated into programming 'languages' 
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(e.g. SQL, C++, PERL, Java). These are rules-based systems, and all users 
rearticulate them, regardless of their own aspiration to digital difference. 
The performance document-maker, in other words, in seeking to inscribe dig-
itally what is particular to the expert practice concerned, has a wide but strictly 
limited range of options available, but cannot otherwise intervene in the display 
options that these control. Hence in adhering to standards, she attempts to obtain 
a best approximation of how the end user will receive the material; and in the 
higher degree set-up, that end-user can be expected to be expert at least in terms 
of the disciplinary field within which the candidate's work is located. That 
user may well not (yet) be expert in the fields of digital inscription, and will need 
as a consequence to be guided by the candidate's own account, included in 
the mixed-mode postgraduate or higher degree submission, of some of the 
meta-praxiological issues at stake. 
My argument, thus, is that by taking the adequate digital inscription itself 
of the 'knowledge objects' specific to expert performance-making process as 
external measure of the latter, the expert-practitioner postgraduate/higher degree 
candidate will begin to obtain an insight into the knowledge specificity of 
her practice that is currently unusual in the higher degree set-up. In such an 
undertaking, where knowledge systems are overlaid, the one upon the other, it 
is likely that the performance practitioner will begin to be able to dissolve 
complex notions that an unreflective language use has the capacity to render 
monolithic. 
In this context, Lyotard 's observations on time, memory effects and digital 
technologies (Lyotard, 1991: 50-87) seem to me to be of interest, despite rapid 
technological development and cultural dissemination over the past two decades: 
for Lyotard, remembering is not monolithic but internally differentiated, and 
I would argue that it is in part this internal differentiation that lends itself to 
the sort of praxiological enquiry into documentation that I am calling for here. 
Plainly the terms he used re-engage with the philosophical tradition that provides 
his own disciplinary expertise, and his enquiry into what he terms 'temporal 
syntheses' revisits Kant, on apprehension and reproduction, Bergson on recogni-
tion, and Freud, on memory; yet his suggestions seem to me to resonate with 
certain sorts of distinctions we might make between certain sorts of material used 
in documentation. 
From the perspective of 'preservation' of a past that needs, in fact, to be recon-
structed (since the cyber-realm otherwise has no memory), Lyotard focuses on 
what might be the bases for the practitioner-documenter's selection of already 
digitised data, already delocalised and detemporalised, and on how simulacra -
one of which is ' the past' itself, and another of which is 'signature' - are 
produced, and might be grasped auto-reflexively as well as expert-intuitively 
(1991: 50). It is these simulacra, once constructed, he argues, that re-anchor data 
in a number of conceptual frames which are likely in tum to trigger their 
own memory effects on behalf of an expert user-researcher, provided we make 
awareness of those sorts of frames available discursively. 
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The three memory effects noted by Lyotard, in the mid-1980s, he argues, 
'coincide more or less with three very different sorts of temporal synthesis linked 
to [digital] inscription' (50): the first mode of temporal synthesis, 'breaching' 
renders the past in terms of habit, including habits of thought and feeling; it coin-
cides with the identification of elements drawn together on the basis of affinity, 
habit or habit-memory. The second, 'scanning', effects its own temporal synthe-
sis and seems to evoke the experience that attaches to that synthesis: it 'implies 
not only the retention of the past in the present as present, but the synthesis of the 
past as such and its reactualization as past, in the present (of consciousness)'. 
Remembering, 'implies the identification of what is remembered through its 
classification in a calendar and a cartography' (51), and it is self-referential: 'it 
remembers its own presuppositions and implications' (53). The third mode of 
temporal synthesis, 'passing', coincides with that involuntary but often puzzling 
memory, which can seem, as though uninvited, to 'come to the practitioner': it is 
associated with 'working through' , in the Freudian psychoanalytic sense of the 
term. Passing, Lyotard adds, uses up more energy than other techniques, because 
'it is a technique with no rule, or a negative rule, deregulation'. It involves an 
ongoing 'working through ' , where elements retained trigger again, in the practi-
tioner, an ongoing enquiry that seems, even as one's work reaches its momentary, 
public instantiation - always a compromise with resistant materialities - to be 
unanswerable. 
CONCLUSION 
If 'we' are to work together, as differently skilled expert practitioners, on the 
digital documentation of signature creative process, with a mixed-mode disserta-
tion in mind, I would argue that a meta-theoretical engagement, on the part of 
the expert digital practitioner, working with the artist on the expert-practitioner 
document, is important. First, the. latter needs to be in a position to advise the 
former, as to what is constitutive to the making processes, and what has most 
commonly been overlooked; and the former needs, on that sort of basis, to be 
able to trial and test digital solutions for disciplinary problems. 'We' may need to 
re-invent historically precise set-ups, and to provide alternative perspectives with 
regard to missing data, if we are to overcome long-established and naturalised 
prejudice. 
The inventiveness and the professional virtuosity of the digital practitioner 
are central here, as soon as we recognise that in order to document the shift in 
perspective to practitioner expertise and experience, creative digital solutions 
need to be found. Second, the expert digital practitioner needs to learn to make 
explicit and therefore transparent to the artist, the existence and operation of 
rules in setting the parameters of the digital document. Third, and finally, all 
partners need to recognise the limits which the existence of a rules-bound digital 
system imposes on any attempt to record material, requiring that the higher 
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degree candidate constitute a rich meta-narrative, derived through collaborative 
invention, if its complexities are to be understood by an eventual user. 
NOTES 
1. http://www.sfmelrose.org.uk 
2. Osborne, P. (2000). Philosophy in Cultural Theory. London : Routledge. 
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